Chapman Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 2

Article 9

2011

Digest: Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa
Clara County Board of Supervisors
Stephanie Brou

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
Recommended Citation
Stephanie Brou, Digest: Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors, 14 Chap. L. Rev. 531 (2011).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol14/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.

Do Not Delete

2/22/2011 11:40 AM

Digest: Committee for Green Foothills v.
Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors
Stephanie Brou
Opinion by Corrigan, J., with George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter,
Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Issue
Does the filing of notice of determination (NOD) without
environmental review trigger a 30-day statute of limitations
under the California Environmental Quality Act?
Facts
In 2000, the Leland Stanford Junior University acquired a
permit to add buildings to its campus.1 Prior to the approval of
the permit, an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) prepared for
the project identified possible environmental impacts and
proposed mitigation measures.2 Because the EIR found that the
development would substantially impact public access to
recreation facilities, a mitigation measure directed Stanford to
coordinate with the County parks department and to dedicate
trail easements.3 The agreement included trails labeled S1 and
C1.4 While the trails were approved in the “Trails Master Plan,”5
and a supplemental EIR was published regarding the S1 trails, a
dispute delayed the C1 trails.6 After continued negotiations the
County authorized the “Trails Agreement” in 2005, which
illustrated the construction, maintenance, and details of the S1
and C1 easements.7
The County Board of Supervisors
determined that the Trails Agreement did not require further
environmental review regarding the C1 trails because it did not
constitute a new project subject to independent California

1 Comm. for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 48 Cal. 4th 32,
39 (2010).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 39 n.2.
6 Id. at 40.
7 Id.
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Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review, but rather was
subsequent activity within the scope of the Trails Master Plan.8
On December 20, 2005, the County filed a revised NOD with
the county clerk reporting that the County approved an
agreement for the C1 and C2 trails.9 The NOD also stated that
an EIR had been prepared and that findings had been made
pursuant to CEQA.10 On June 9, 2006 (171 days after the revised
NOD was filed), the Committee for Green Foothills (Committee)
challenged the County’s approval of the Trails Agreement.11 The
trial court sustained the County’s demurrer on the grounds that
the NOD triggered a 30-day statute of limitations, and thus the
Committee’s challenge was time-barred.12 The Court of Appeal
reversed, concluding there was “a reasonable possibility” that a
longer 180-day statute of limitations applied.13
Analysis
California Environmental Quality Act section 21152(a)
requires a local agency that approves or embarks on a project
that is subject to CEQA to file an NOD with the county clerk.14
Also, if an agency approves a project it believes is exempt from
CEQA, it must file a notice of exemption with the county clerk.15
These filings are intended to preserve the public’s right to be
informed and aware of environmental decisions.16 Section 21167
establishes an unusually short 30-day statute of limitations for
CEQA challenges to be brought, running from the date of NOD or
notice of exemption.17 If no NOD or notice of exemption was
filed, the statute of limitations is increased to 180 days from the
approval of the project; if a project is begun without a decision
regarding the environmental impacts, the statute of limitations
is 180 days from commencement of the project.18 The Committee
contended that the Trails Agreement constituted a project
separate from the Trails Master Plan, and that the County
approved the Trails Agreement without consideration of the

Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 42.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 42–43 (citing California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 21152(a) (2010)).
15 Id. at 43 (citing California Environmental Quality Act § 21152(b)).
16 Id. at 43.
17 Id. at 44 n.8 (citing California Environmental Quality Act § 21167).
18 Id. at 44 n.8.
8
9
10
11
12
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environmental effects, thus the 180-day statute of limitations
applied.19
The court found that the statutory language of section 21167
“strongly suggests that the Legislature intended the filing of an
NOD to trigger a 30-day statute of limitations.”20 The plain
language of section 21167 requires a 30-day statute of limitations
for all claims related to a project when a notice is filed.21 Only
when notice is not given does the 180-day statute of limitations
apply.22 Logically, when an agency alerts the public about a
decision, the public can be expected to act quickly in challenging
that decision.23 However, when an agency does not give notice,
the public is not alerted until constructive notice is given by the
start of the project, thus necessitating an extended statute of
limitations.24
Statutory language does not support the
Committee’s claim that the 180-day statute of limitations should
apply despite the filing of an NOD.25
The Regulatory Guidelines implementing CEQA further
support the contention that a 30-day statute of limitations
applies.26 The Guidelines offer additional rules and statutes of
limitations for CEQA challenges.27 Each limitation is either 30
or 35 days when notice is given.28 Similar to section 21167, a
180-day statute of limitations applies only when there is not
public notice.29
The court found further support for a shorter statute of
limitations in two similar bill reports concerning the Department
of Water Resources and the Governor’s Office of Planning and
Research.30 Both bill reports require claims to be filed within 30
days of notice.31 The court relied on the fact that the Guidelines
and the two similar bills have identical statutes of limitations in
its conclusion that the Legislature clearly intended to impose
strict limits on the timeframe of challenging a project.32 The
Committee provided no evidence to suggest that the Legislature

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 47–48.
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 49–50 n.15.
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intended to increase the statute of limitations six-fold, despite
notice being provided.33
Legislative intent for a short statute of limitations is
consistent with policy considerations for prompt filing of
challenges.34 CEQA challenges impose financial prejudice and
disruption to development and must not be permitted to delay
projects.35 Additionally, a clear and short statute of limitations
provides certainty.36 Public policy does not support delay or
uncertainty that encourages builders to wait 180 days before
commencing on approved projects to avoid litigation.37 In fact,
unnecessary delay is precisely what the Legislature intended to
avoid by imposing a short statute of limitations.38
The Committee argued that the longer statute of limitations
should apply because the County did not conduct an
environmental review before approving the agreement.39 The
court rejected this argument, citing California Manufacturers
Ass’n. v. Industrial Welfare Commission.40 Like the Committee
in the instant case, in California Manufacturers, an association
argued that the 30-day statute of limitations applies only if the
agency has conducted an environmental investigation.41 There,
the Court of Appeal determined that the trigger of the 30-day
statute of limitations was the notice, not the substance of the
agency’s decision.42 Here, the court agreed and further stated
that, where an NOD has been filed, the agency has attempted
compliance with CEQA.43 Accordingly, the Legislature intended
for the 30-day statute of limitations to apply regardless of
environmental review.44
Next, the Committee argued that the NOD was invalid and
therefore did not trigger the 30-day statute of limitations.45 The
court noted that several cases have made exceptions to the strict
statute of limitations when notice was materially defective.46 In

Id. at 50.
Id. (citing Oceanside Marina Towers Ass’n. v. Oceanside Cmty. Dev. Comm’n, 187
Cal. App. 3d 735, 741 (1986)).
35 Id. (citing Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 4th 830, 837 (1994)).
36 Id. at 50.
37 Id. at 50–51.
38 Id. at 51.
39 Id.
40 Id. (citing Cal. Mfrs. Ass’n. v. Indus. Welfare Comm’n, 109 Cal. App. 3d 95, 124–25
(1980)).
41 Id.
42 Id. (citing Cal. Mfrs., 109 Cal. App. 3d at 125).
43 Id. at 51.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 52.
46 Id.
33
34
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ILWU v. Board of Directors, the court did not enforce a 35-day
statute of limitations because the notice was not in substantial
compliance of the notice requirements.47 Similarly, in Citizens of
Lake Murray Area Ass’n. v. City Council, the court refused to
hold plaintiffs to a 30-day statute of limitations because the
county clerk failed to post the notice pursuant to the statute.48
While the Committee relied on the foregoing cases, the court
distinguished them from the instant case, finding instead that
the County’s notice contained every provision required by the
CEQA guidelines and thus was not materially defective.49
The Committee contended that the NOD for the Trails
Agreement should be separate and distinct from the NOD for the
Trails Master Plan.50 Additionally, the Committee alleged that
the County issued the NOD to include the C1 and C2 trails with
a bad faith intention to conceal these additional trails.51 While
the court agreed that the County could have issued two separate
NODs, they declined to impose that additional requirement when
nothing in CEQA precludes disclosure of two approvals in a
single notice.52 Additionally, there was no evidence that the
County acted with bad intention.53 In fact, the Board’s resolution
was passed at a meeting where the Committee’s representative
was present.54 The Legislature intended for NODs to trigger the
30-day statute of limitations.55 Thus, it was the responsibility of
the Committee to review these notices carefully.56
The Committee’s final argument was that the revised NOD
was invalid because the County failed to make an environmental
determination and prepare a corresponding negative declaration
or EIR.57 The court found this claim unpersuasive, instead
determining that no new CEQA document was required.58 CEQA
does not require a new EIR for every subsequent step in the same
project.59 After a proper EIR is prepared, a supplemental EIR is
only required if substantial changes arise or new information

Id. at 52–53. (citing ILWU v Bd. of Dirs., 116 Cal. App. 3d 265, 273 (1981)).
Id. at 53 (citing Citizens of Lake Murray Area Ass’n. v. City Council, 129 Cal. App.
3d 436, 438 (1982)).
49 Id. at 53.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 53–54.
52 Id. at 54.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. (citing California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21108,
21152 (2010)).
59 Id. at 54.
47
48
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becomes known that was not available at the time of the original
EIR.60
The Committee was correct in asserting that if
subsequent activity could have environmental effects not
considered in the existing EIR, the agency must conduct an
initial study resulting in either a negative declaration or an
EIR.61 However, if the agency finds that no new environmental
effects could occur, the subsequent activity can be considered
within the scope of the project covered by the existing EIR and no
new determination is required.62
The Trails Agreement qualified as a subsequent activity
subject to potential further environmental review, and thus the
County was required to evaluate the potential environmental
impact—which it did.63 The County issued a resolution finding
the Trails Agreement required no addition CEQA review prior to
commencing the Trails Agreement.64 The court deemed it
unnecessary to examine whether the County’s determination was
proper.65
The fact that the County evaluated the Trails
Agreement as subsequent activity to a program EIR and that it
had found the Trails Agreement to be within the scope of the EIR
was sufficient.66
An NOD triggers the 30-day statute of
limitations even if environmental review is inadequate.67
Holding
The court reversed the Court of Appeal.68 The court held the
County’s filing of the NOD triggered the 30-day statute of
limitations.69 Because the Committee filed its petition more than
30 days after the NOD, the suit was time-barred.70
Legal Significance
The court’s decision strictly applies a shorter statute of
limitations when notice is given. Because lack of environmental
review and potential errors in the notice do not necessarily
extend the statute of limitations, potential litigators challenging
CEQA must carefully review NODs and file a petition within the
30-day statute of limitations.

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55–56.
Id. at 56–57.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id.

